

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND**

CARL LEWIS, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

LAFAYETTE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,

Defendant.

Case No. 8:25-cv-01006

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Carl Lewis (“Plaintiff”) brings this Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”) against Lafayette Federal Credit Union (“Defendant”) as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and alleges, upon personal knowledge as to his own actions and his counsels’ investigation, and upon information and belief as to all other matters, as follows:

SUMMARY OF ACTION

1. Plaintiff brings this class action against Defendant for its failure to properly secure and safeguard sensitive information of its customers.
2. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ sensitive personal information—which they entrusted to Defendant on the mutual understanding that Defendant would protect it against disclosure—was targeted, compromised and unlawfully accessed due to the Data Breach.
3. The PII compromised in the Data Breach included Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ full names, dates of birth, financial account numbers, and Social Security numbers (“personally identifiable information” or “PII”).

4. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff and approximately 75,000 Class Members¹ suffered concrete injuries in fact including, but not limited to: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of their PII; (iii) lost or diminished value of PII; (iv) lost time and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) lost opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (vii) nominal damages; and (viii) the continued and certainly increased risk to their PII, which: (a) remains unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains backed up in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the PII.

5. Plaintiff brings this class action lawsuit on behalf all those similarly situated to address Defendant's inadequate safeguarding of Class Members' PII that it collected and maintained, and for failing to provide timely and adequate notice to Plaintiff and other Class Members that their information had been subject to the unauthorized access by an unknown third party and precisely what specific type of information was accessed.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. This Court has original jurisdiction over this action under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) because at least one member of the putative Class, as defined below, is a citizen of a different state than Defendant, there are more than 100 putative class members, and the amount in controversy exceeds \$5 million exclusive of interest and costs.

7. This Court has general personal jurisdiction over Defendant because it maintains

¹ <https://www.maine.gov/agviewer/content/ag/985235c7-cb95-4be2-8792-a1252b4f8318/6c038d1f-41db-4c57-9bdd-c1c7215b7eba.html>

its principal place of business in this District, regularly conducts business in Maryland, and has sufficient minimum contacts in Maryland.

8. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendant's principal place of business is in this District and a substantial part of the events, acts, and omissions giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in this District

PARTIES

9. Plaintiff Carl Lewis is a resident and citizen of Sacramento, California.

10. Defendant Lafayette Federal Credit Union is a company with its principal place of business located in Rockville, Maryland.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Defendant's Business

11. Defendant is a financial institution that operates eight full-service branch locations in the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia.

12. Plaintiff and Class Members are current and former customers at Defendant.

13. In the course of their relationship, customers, including Plaintiff and Class Members, provided Defendant with their sensitive PII.

14. Upon information and belief, in the course of collecting PII from customers, including Plaintiff, Defendant promised to provide confidentiality and adequate security for the data it collected from customers through its applicable privacy policy and through other disclosures in compliance with statutory privacy requirements.

15. Indeed, Defendant provides on its website that: "[t]o protect your personal information from unauthorized access and use, we use security measures that comply with federal

law. These measures include computer safeguards and secured files and buildings."²

The Data Breach

16. On or about March 20, 2025, Defendant began sending Plaintiff and other Data Breach victims a Notice of Data Breach letter (the "Notice Letter"), informing them that:

What Happened? We recently learned that an unknown, unauthorized third party gained access to one LFCU employee email account. Upon discovering the incident, we promptly secured the email account and began an internal investigation. We also engaged a forensic security firm to investigate and confirm the security of our email systems. The investigation determined that an unauthorized third party accessed the email account for a brief period on September 16, 2024, and may have acquired the information contained in the account.³

17. Defendant did not use reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the sensitive information they were maintaining for Plaintiff and Class Members, causing the exposure of PII, such as encrypting the information or deleting it when it is no longer needed.

18. The attacker accessed and acquired files containing unencrypted PII of Plaintiff and Class Members. Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII was accessed and stolen in the Data Breach.

19. Plaintiff further believes that his PII and that of Class Members was subsequently sold on the dark web following the Data Breach, as that is the *modus operandi* of cybercriminals that commit cyber-attacks of this type.

Data Breaches Are Preventable

20. As explained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, "[p]revention is the most

² <https://www.lfcu.org/privacy-policy/>

³ The "Notice Letter". A sample copy is available at <https://www.maine.gov/agviewer/content/ag/985235c7-cb95-4be2-8792-a1252b4f8318/e874ba63-10fe-49a3-a92f-fd79c81edb00.html>

effective defense against ransomware and it is critical to take precautions for protection.”⁴

21. To prevent and detect cyber-attacks and/or ransomware attacks, Defendant could and should have implemented, as recommended by the United States Government, the following measures:

- Implement an awareness and training program. Because end users are targets, employees and individuals should be aware of the threat of ransomware and how it is delivered.
- Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching the end users and authenticate inbound email using technologies like Sender Policy Framework (SPF), Domain Message Authentication Reporting and Conformance (DMARC), and DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) to prevent email spoofing.
- Scan all incoming and outgoing emails to detect threats and filter executable files from reaching end users.
- Configure firewalls to block access to known malicious IP addresses.
- Patch operating systems, software, and firmware on devices. Consider using a centralized patch management system.
- Set anti-virus and anti-malware programs to conduct regular scans automatically.
- Consider disabling Remote Desktop protocol (RDP) if it is not being used.
- Use application whitelisting, which only allows systems to execute programs known and permitted by security policy.
- Execute operating system environments or specific programs in a virtualized environment.
- Categorize data based on organizational value and implement physical and logical separation of networks and data for different organizational units.⁵

22. The occurrence of the Data Breach indicates that Defendant failed to adequately implement one or more of the above measures to prevent cyberattacks, resulting in the Data Breach

⁴ How to Protect Your Networks from RANSOMWARE, at 3, *available at*: <https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ransomware-prevention-and-response-for-cisos.pdf/view>

⁵ *Id.* at 3-4.

and data thieves acquiring and accessing the PII of more than seventy thousand individuals, including that of Plaintiff and Class Members.

Defendant Acquires, Collects, And Stores Its Customers' PII

23. Defendant acquires, collects, and stores a massive amount of PII on its current and former customers.

24. As a condition of obtaining services at Defendant, Defendant requires that customers and other personnel entrust it with highly sensitive personal information.

25. By obtaining, collecting, and using Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII, Defendant assumed legal and equitable duties and knew or should have known that it was responsible for protecting Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII from disclosure.

Defendant Knew, Or Should Have Known, of the Risk Because Financial Institutions In Possession Of PII Are Particularly Susceptible To Cyber Attacks

26. Defendant's data security obligations were particularly important given the substantial increase in cyber-attacks and/or data breaches targeting financial institutions that collect and store PII, like Defendant, preceding the date of the breach.

27. In light of recent high profile data breaches at other industry leading companies, including National Public Data (2.9 billion records, August 2024), Ticketmaster Entertainment, LLC (560 million records, May 2024), Change Healthcare Inc. (145 million records, February 2024), Dell Technologies, Inc. (49 million records, May 2024), and AT&T Inc. (73 million records, April 2024), Defendant knew or should have known that the PII that they collected and maintained would be targeted by cybercriminals.

28. Plaintiff and Class Members now face years of constant surveillance of their financial and personal records, monitoring, and loss of rights. The Class is incurring and will continue to incur such damages in addition to any fraudulent use of their PII.

29. As a financial institution in custody of the PII of its customers, Defendant knew, or should have known, the importance of safeguarding PII entrusted to it by Plaintiff and Class Members, and of the foreseeable consequences if its data security systems were breached. This includes the significant costs imposed on Plaintiff and Class Members as a result of a breach. Defendant failed, however, to take adequate cybersecurity measures to prevent the Data Breach.

Value Of Personally Identifying Information

30. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) defines identity theft as “a fraud committed or attempted using the identifying information of another person without authority.”⁶ The FTC describes “identifying information” as “any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific person,” including, among other things, “[n]ame, Social Security number, date of birth, official State or government issued driver’s license or identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number.”⁷

31. The PII of individuals remains of high value to criminals, as evidenced by the prices they will pay through the dark web. Numerous sources cite dark web pricing for stolen identity credentials.⁸

32. For example, Personal Information can be sold at a price ranging from \$40 to \$200.⁹ Criminals can also purchase access to entire company data breaches from \$900 to \$4,500.¹⁰

⁶ 17 C.F.R. § 248.201 (2013).

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ *Your personal data is for sale on the dark web. Here’s how much it costs*, Digital Trends, Oct. 16, 2019, available at: <https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/personal-data-sold-on-the-dark-web-how-much-it-costs/>

⁹ *Here’s How Much Your Personal Information Is Selling for on the Dark Web*, Experian, Dec. 6, 2017, available at: <https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/heres-how-much-your-personal-information-is-selling-for-on-the-dark-web/>

¹⁰ *In the Dark*, VPNOOverview, 2019, available at: <https://vpnooverview.com/privacy/anonymous-browsing/in-the-dark/>

33. Of course, a stolen Social Security number – standing alone – can be used to wreak untold havoc upon a victim’s personal and financial life. The popular person privacy and credit monitoring service LifeLock by Norton notes “Five Malicious Ways a Thief Can Use Your Social Security Number,” including 1) Financial Identity Theft that includes “false applications for loans, credit cards or bank accounts in your name or withdraw money from your accounts, and which can encompass credit card fraud, bank fraud, computer fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud and employment fraud; 2) Government Identity Theft, including tax refund fraud; 3) Criminal Identity Theft, which involves using someone’s stolen Social Security number as a “get out of jail free card;” 4) Medical Identity Theft, and 5) Utility Fraud.

34. It is little wonder that courts have dubbed a stolen Social Security number as the “gold standard” for identity theft and fraud. Social Security numbers are among the worst kind of PII to have stolen because they may be put to a variety of fraudulent uses and are difficult for an individual to change.

35. What’s more, it is no easy task to change or cancel a stolen Social Security number. An individual cannot obtain a new Social Security number without significant paperwork and evidence of actual misuse. In other words, preventive action to defend against the possibility of misuse of a Social Security number is not permitted; an individual must show evidence of actual, ongoing fraud activity to obtain a new number.

36. Even then, a new Social Security number may not be effective. According to Julie Ferguson of the Identity Theft Resource Center, “[t]he credit bureaus and banks are able to link the new number very quickly to the old number, so all of that old bad information is quickly

inherited into the new Social Security number.”¹¹

37. Based on the foregoing, the information compromised in the Data Breach is significantly more valuable than the loss of, for example, credit card information in a retailer data breach because, there, victims can cancel or close credit and debit card accounts. The information compromised in this Data Breach is impossible to “close” and difficult, if not impossible, to change.

38. The fraudulent activity resulting from the Data Breach may not come to light for years. There may be a time lag between when harm occurs versus when it is discovered, and also between when PII is stolen and when it is used. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), which conducted a study regarding data breaches:

39. Plaintiff and Class Members now face years of constant surveillance of their financial and personal records, monitoring, and loss of rights. The Class is incurring and will continue to incur such damages in addition to any fraudulent use of their PII.

Defendant Fails To Comply With FTC Guidelines

40. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has promulgated numerous guides for businesses which highlight the importance of implementing reasonable data security practices. According to the FTC, the need for data security should be factored into all business decision-making.

41. In 2016, the FTC updated its publication, Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business, which established cyber-security guidelines for businesses. These guidelines note that businesses should protect the personal consumer information that they keep; properly dispose

¹¹ Bryan Naylor, *Victims of Social Security Number Theft Find It’s Hard to Bounce Back*, NPR (Feb. 9, 2015), available at: <http://www.npr.org/2015/02/09/384875839/data-stolen-by-anthem-s-hackers-has-millionsworrying-about-identity-theft>

of personal information that is no longer needed; encrypt information stored on computer networks; understand their network's vulnerabilities; and implement policies to correct any security problems.¹²

42. The guidelines also recommend that businesses use an intrusion detection system to expose a breach as soon as it occurs; monitor all incoming traffic for activity indicating someone is attempting to hack the system; watch for large amounts of data being transmitted from the system; and have a response plan ready in the event of a breach.¹³

43. The FTC further recommends that companies not maintain PII longer than is needed for authorization of a transaction; limit access to sensitive data; require complex passwords to be used on networks; use industry-tested methods for security; monitor for suspicious activity on the network; and verify that third-party service providers have implemented reasonable security measures.

44. The FTC has brought enforcement actions against businesses for failing to adequately and reasonably protect consumer data, treating the failure to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to confidential consumer data as an unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA"), 15 U.S.C. § 45. Orders resulting from these actions further clarify the measures businesses must take to meet their data security obligations.

45. These FTC enforcement actions include actions against Financial institutions, like Defendant.

46. Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, prohibits "unfair . . . practices in or

¹² *Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business*, Federal Trade Commission (2016). Available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136_proteting-personal-information.pdf

¹³ *Id.*

affecting commerce,” including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair act or practice by businesses, such as Defendant, of failing to use reasonable measures to protect PII. The FTC publications and orders described above also form part of the basis of Defendant's duty in this regard.

47. Defendant failed to properly implement basic data security practices.

48. Defendant's failure to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to the PII of its customers or to comply with applicable industry standards constitutes an unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.

49. Upon information and belief, Defendant was at all times fully aware of its obligation to protect the PII of its customers, Defendant was also aware of the significant repercussions that would result from its failure to do so. Accordingly, Defendant's conduct was particularly unreasonable given the nature and amount of PII it obtained and stored and the foreseeable consequences of the immense damages that would result to Plaintiff and the Class.

Defendant Failed to Comply with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act

50. Defendant is a financial institution, as that term is defined by Section 509(3)(A) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)(A), and thus is subject to the GLBA.

51. The GLBA defines a financial institution as “any institution the business of which is engaging in financial activities as described in Section 1843(k) of Title 12 [The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956].” 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)(A).

52. Defendant collects nonpublic personal information, as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4)(A), 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(n) and 12 C.F.R. § 1016.3(p)(1). Accordingly, during the relevant

time period Defendant were subject to the requirements of the GLBA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801.1, *et seq.*, and is subject to numerous rules and regulations promulgated on the GLBA statutes.

53. The GLBA Privacy Rule became effective on July 1, 2001. *See* 16 C.F.R. Part 313. Since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act on July 21, 2010, the CFPB became responsible for implementing the Privacy Rule. In December 2011, the CFPB restated the implementing regulations in an interim final rule that established the Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, Regulation P, 12 C.F.R. § 1016 (“Regulation P”), with the final version becoming effective on October 28, 2014.

54. Accordingly, Defendant's conduct is governed by the Privacy Rule prior to December 30, 2011 and by Regulation P after that date.

55. Both the Privacy Rule and Regulation P require financial institutions to provide customers with an initial and annual privacy notice. These privacy notices must be “clear and conspicuous.” 16 C.F.R. §§ 313.4 and 313.5; 12 C.F.R. §§ 1016.4 and 1016.5. “Clear and conspicuous means that a notice is reasonably understandable and designed to call attention to the nature and significance of the information in the notice.” 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(b)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 1016.3(b)(1). These privacy notices must “accurately reflect[] [the financial institution’s] privacy policies and practices.” 16 C.F.R. § 313.4 and 313.5; 12 C.F.R. §§ 1016.4 and 1016.5. They must include specified elements, including the categories of nonpublic personal information the financial institution collects and discloses, the categories of third parties to whom the financial institution discloses the information, and the financial institution’s security and confidentiality policies and practices for nonpublic personal information. 16 C.F.R. § 313.6; 12 C.F.R. § 1016.6. These privacy notices must be provided “so that each consumer can reasonably be expected to receive actual notice.” 16 C.F.R. § 313.9; 12 C.F.R. § 1016.9. As alleged herein, Defendant

violated the Privacy Rule and Regulation P.

56. Upon information and belief, Defendant failed to provide annual privacy notices to customers after the customer relationship ended, despite retaining these customers' PII and storing that PII on Defendant's network systems.

57. Defendant failed to adequately inform their customers that they were storing and/or sharing, or would store and/or share, the customers' PII on an insecure platform, accessible to unauthorized parties from the internet, and would do so after the customer relationship ended.

58. The Safeguards Rule, which implements Section 501(b) of the GLBA, 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b), requires financial institutions to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer information by developing a comprehensive written information security program that contains reasonable administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, including: (1) designating one or more employees to coordinate the information security program; (2) identifying reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks to the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer information, and assessing the sufficiency of any safeguards in place to control those risks; (3) designing and implementing information safeguards to control the risks identified through risk assessment, and regularly testing or otherwise monitoring the effectiveness of the safeguards' key controls, systems, and procedures; (4) overseeing service providers and requiring them by contract to protect the security and confidentiality of customer information; and (5) evaluating and adjusting the information security program in light of the results of testing and monitoring, changes to the business operation, and other relevant circumstances. 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.3 and 314.4.

59. As alleged herein, Defendant violated the Safeguard Rule.

60. Defendant failed to assess reasonably foreseeable risks to the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer information and failed to monitor the systems of its IT

partners or verify the integrity of those systems.

61. Defendant violated the GLBA and its own policies and procedures by sharing the PII of Plaintiff and Class Members with a non-affiliated third party without providing Plaintiff and Class Members (a) an opt-out notice and (b) a reasonable opportunity to opt out of such disclosure.

Defendant Fails To Comply With Industry Standards

62. As noted above, experts studying cyber security routinely identify financial institutions in possession of PII as being particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks because of the value of the PII which they collect and maintain.

63. Several best practices have been identified that, at a minimum, should be implemented by financial institutions in possession of PII, like Defendant, including but not limited to: educating all employees; strong passwords; multi-layer security, including firewalls, anti-virus, and anti-malware software; encryption, making data unreadable without a key; multi-factor authentication; backup data and limiting which employees can access sensitive data. Defendant failed to follow these industry best practices, including a failure to implement multi-factor authentication.

64. Other best cybersecurity practices that are standard for financial institutions include installing appropriate malware detection software; monitoring and limiting the network ports; protecting web browsers and email management systems; setting up network systems such as firewalls, switches and routers; monitoring and protection of physical security systems; protection against any possible communication system; training staff regarding critical points. Defendant failed to follow these cybersecurity best practices, including failure to train staff.

65. Defendant failed to meet the minimum standards of any of the following frameworks: the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Version 2.0 (including without limitation

PR.AA-01, PR.AA.-02, PR.AA-03, PR.AA-04, PR.AA-05, PR.AT-01, PR.DS-01, PR.DS-02, PR.DS-10, PR.PS-01, PR.PS-02, PR.PS-05, PR.IR-01, DE.CM-01, DE.CM-03, DE.CM-06, DE.CM-09, and RS.CO-04), and the Center for Internet Security’s Critical Security Controls (CIS CSC), which are all established standards in reasonable cybersecurity readiness.

66. These foregoing frameworks are existing and applicable industry standards for financial institutions, and upon information and belief, Defendant failed to comply with at least one—or all—of these accepted standards, thereby opening the door to the threat actor and causing the Data Breach.

Data Breaches Increase Victims' Risk Of Identity Theft

67. Unencrypted PII may also fall into the hands of companies that will use the detailed PII for targeted marketing without the approval of Plaintiff and Class Members. Simply put, unauthorized individuals can easily access the PII of Plaintiff and Class Members.

68. The link between a data breach and the risk of identity theft is simple and well established. Criminals acquire and steal PII to monetize the information. Criminals monetize the data by selling the stolen information on the black market to other criminals who then utilize the information to commit a variety of identity theft related crimes discussed below.

69. Due to the risk of one’s Social Security number being exposed, state legislatures have passed laws in recognition of the risk: “[t]he social security number can be used as a tool to perpetuate fraud against a person and to acquire sensitive personal, financial, medical, and familial information, the release of which could cause great financial or personal harm to an individual. While the social security number was intended to be used solely for the administration of the federal Social Security System, over time this unique numeric identifier has been used extensively

for identity verification purposes[.]”¹⁴

70. Moreover, “SSNs have been central to the American identity infrastructure for years, being used as a key identifier[.] . . . U.S. banking processes have also had SSNs baked into their identification process for years. In fact, SSNs have been the gold standard for identifying and verifying the credit history of prospective customers.”¹⁵

71. “Despite the risk of fraud associated with the theft of Social Security numbers, just five of the nation’s largest 25 banks have stopped using the numbers to verify a customer’s identity after the initial account setup[.]”¹⁶ Accordingly, since Social Security numbers are frequently used to verify an individual’s identity after logging onto an account or attempting a transaction, “[h]aving access to your Social Security number may be enough to help a thief steal money from your bank account”¹⁷

72. One such example of criminals piecing together bits and pieces of compromised PII for profit is the development of “Fullz” packages.¹⁸

¹⁴ See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1.10(1).

¹⁵ See <https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/banks-need-to-stop-relying-on-social-security-numbers>

¹⁶ See <https://archive.nytimes.com/bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/just-5-banks-prohibit-use-of-social-security-numbers/>

¹⁷ See <https://www.credit.com/blog/5-things-an-identity-thief-can-do-with-your-social-security-number-108597/>

¹⁸ “Fullz” is fraudster speak for data that includes the information of the victim, including, but not limited to, the name, address, credit card information, social security number, date of birth, and more. As a rule of thumb, the more information you have on a victim, the more money that can be made off of those credentials. Fullz are usually pricier than standard credit card credentials, commanding up to \$100 per record (or more) on the dark web. Fullz can be cashed out (turning credentials into money) in various ways, including performing bank transactions over the phone with the required authentication details in-hand. Even “dead Fullz,” which are Fullz credentials associated with credit cards that are no longer valid, can still be used for numerous purposes, including tax refund scams, ordering credit cards on behalf of the victim, or opening a “mule account” (an account that will accept a fraudulent money transfer from a compromised account) without the victim’s knowledge. See, e.g., Brian Krebs, *Medical Records for Sale in Underground Stolen From Texas Life Insurance Firm*, Krebs on Security (Sep. 18, 2014), <https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/09/medical-records-for-sale-in-underground-stolen-from-texas->

73. With “Fullz” packages, cyber-criminals can cross-reference two sources of PII to marry unregulated data available elsewhere to criminally stolen data with an astonishingly complete scope and degree of accuracy in order to assemble complete dossiers on individuals.

74. The development of “Fullz” packages means here that the stolen PII from the Data Breach can easily be used to link and identify it to Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ phone numbers, email addresses, and other unregulated sources and identifiers. In other words, even if certain information such as emails, phone numbers, or credit card numbers may not be included in the PII that was exfiltrated in the Data Breach, criminals may still easily create a Fullz package and sell it at a higher price to unscrupulous operators and criminals (such as illegal and scam telemarketers) over and over.

75. The existence and prevalence of “Fullz” packages means that the PII stolen from the data breach can easily be linked to the unregulated data (like contact information) of Plaintiff and the other Class Members. Thus, even if certain information (such as contact information) was not stolen in the data breach, criminals can still easily create a comprehensive “Fullz” package. Then, this comprehensive dossier can be sold—and then resold in perpetuity—to crooked operators and other criminals (like illegal and scam telemarketers).

Loss Of Time To Mitigate Risk Of Identity Theft & Fraud

76. As a result of the recognized risk of identity theft, when a Data Breach occurs, and an individual is notified by a company that their PII was compromised, as in this Data Breach, the reasonable person is expected to take steps and spend time to address the dangerous situation, learn about the breach, and otherwise mitigate the risk of becoming a victim of identity theft or fraud. Failure to spend time taking steps to review accounts or credit reports could expose the individual

life-insurance-](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/09/medical-records-for-sale-in-underground-stolen-from-texas-life-insurance-firm/>)

to greater financial harm – yet, the resource and asset of time has been lost.

77. Thus, Defendant, in its Notice Letter instructs Class Members to “remain vigilant to protect against potential fraud and/or identity theft by, among other things, reviewing your account statements and monitoring credit reports closely.”¹⁹

78. Plaintiff and Class Members have spent, and will spend additional time in the future, on a variety of prudent actions, such as researching and verifying the legitimacy of the Data Breach. Accordingly, the Data Breach has caused Plaintiff and Class Members to suffer actual injury in the form of lost time—which cannot be recaptured—spent on mitigation activities.

79. Plaintiff’s mitigation efforts are consistent with the U.S. Government Accountability Office that released a report in 2007 regarding data breaches (“GAO Report”) in which it noted that victims of identity theft will face “substantial costs and time to repair the damage to their good name and credit record.”²⁰

Diminution of Value of PII

80. PII is a valuable property right.²¹ Its value is axiomatic, considering the value of Big Data in corporate America and the consequences of cyber thefts include heavy prison sentences. Even this obvious risk to reward analysis illustrates beyond doubt that PII has considerable market value.

81. Sensitive PII can sell for as much as \$363 per record according to the Infosec

¹⁹ *Id.*

²⁰ See United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-737, Personal Information: Data Breaches Are Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, the Full Extent Is Unknown (June 2007), <https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf>.

²¹ See “Data Breaches Are Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, the Full Extent Is Unknown,” p. 2, U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 2007, <https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf> (“GAO Report”).

Institute.²² An active and robust legitimate marketplace for PII also exists. In 2019, the data brokering industry was worth roughly \$200 billion.²³

82. In fact, the data marketplace is so sophisticated that consumers can actually sell their non-public information directly to a data broker who in turn aggregates the information and provides it to marketers or app developers.^{24,25}

Future Cost of Credit and Identity Theft Monitoring is Reasonable and Necessary

83. Given the type of targeted attack in this case, sophisticated criminal activity, and the type of PII involved, there is a strong probability that entire batches of stolen information have been placed, or will be placed, on the black market/dark web for sale and purchase by criminals intending to utilize the PII for identity theft crimes –e.g., opening bank accounts in the victims’ names to make purchases or to launder money; file false tax returns; take out loans or lines of credit; or file false unemployment claims.

84. Such fraud may go undetected until debt collection calls commence months, or even years, later. An individual may not know that his or his PII was used to file for unemployment benefits until law enforcement notifies the individual’s employer of the suspected fraud. Fraudulent tax returns are typically discovered only when an individual’s authentic tax return is rejected. Consequently, Plaintiff and Class Members are at an increased risk of fraud and identity theft for many years into the future.

²² See, e.g., John T. Soma, et al, Corporate Privacy Trend: The “Value” of Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”) Equals the “Value” of Financial Assets, 15 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 11, at *3-4 (2009) (“PII, which companies obtain at little cost, has quantifiable value that is rapidly reaching a level comparable to the value of traditional financial assets.”) (citations omitted).

²³ See Ashiq Ja, *Hackers Selling Healthcare Data in the Black Market*, InfoSec (July 27, 2015), <https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/hackers-selling-healthcare-data-in-the-black-market/>

²⁴ <https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-11-05/column-data-brokers>

²⁵ <https://datacoup.com/>

Loss Of Benefit Of The Bargain

85. Furthermore, Defendant's poor data security practices deprived Plaintiff and Class Members of the benefit of their bargain. When agreeing to pay Defendant and/or its agents for services, Plaintiff and other reasonable consumers understood and expected that they were, in part, paying for the product and/or service and necessary data security to protect the PII, when in fact, Defendant did not provide the expected data security. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Class Members received services that were of a lesser value than what they reasonably expected to receive under the bargains they struck with Defendant.

Plaintiff Carl Lewis's Experience

86. Upon information and belief, Defendant obtained Plaintiff's PII in the course of conducting its regular business operations.

87. Upon information and belief, at the time of the Data Breach, Defendant maintained Plaintiff's PII in its system.

88. Plaintiff Lewis is very careful about sharing his sensitive PII. Plaintiff stores any documents containing his PII in a safe and secure location. Plaintiff has never knowingly transmitted unencrypted sensitive PII over the internet or any other unsecured source and would not have entrusted his PII to Defendant had he known of Defendant's lax data security policies.

89. Plaintiff received the Notice Letter by U.S. mail, directly from Defendant, dated March 20, 2025. According to the Notice Letter, Plaintiff's PII was improperly accessed and obtained by unauthorized third parties, including his name, date of birth, financial account number, and Social Security number.

90. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff made reasonable efforts to mitigate the impact of the Data Breach, including researching and verifying the legitimacy of the Data

Breach—valuable time Plaintiff otherwise would have spent on other activities, including but not limited to work and/or recreation. This time has been lost forever and cannot be recaptured.

91. Plaintiff suffered actual injury from having his PII compromised as a result of the Data Breach including, but not limited to: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of his PII; (iii) lost or diminished value of PII; (iv) lost time and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) lost opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (vii) nominal damages; and (viii) the continued and certainly increased risk to his PII, which: (a) remains unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains backed up in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the PII.

92. The Data Breach has caused Plaintiff to suffer fear, anxiety, and stress, which has been compounded by the fact that Defendant has still not fully informed Plaintiff of key details about the Data Breach's occurrence.

93. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable time and money on an ongoing basis to try to mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach.

94. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff is at a present risk and will continue to be at increased risk of identity theft and fraud for years to come.

95. Plaintiff Carl Lewis has a continuing interest in ensuring that his PII, which, upon information and belief, remains backed up in Defendant's possession, is protected and safeguarded from future breaches.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

96. Plaintiff brings this nationwide class action on behalf of himself and on behalf of

all others similarly situated, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, for the following Classes defined as:

Nationwide Class

All persons in the United States whose PII was compromised as a result of the Data Breach reported by Defendant in March 2025 (the “Class”).

California Subclass

All persons in the state of California whose PII was compromised as a result of the Data Breach reported by Defendant in March 2025 (the “California Subclass”).

97. Excluded from the Class are the following individuals and/or entities: Defendant and Defendant's parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, and any entity in which Defendant have a controlling interest; all individuals who make a timely election to be excluded from this proceeding using the correct protocol for opting out; and all judges assigned to hear any aspect of this litigation, as well as their immediate family members.

98. Numerosity: The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, if not completely impossible. According to the breach report submitted to the Office of the Maine Attorney General, approximately 75,000 persons were impacted in the Data Breach.²⁶

99. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions affecting solely individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following:

- a. Whether and to what extent Defendant had a duty to protect the PII of Plaintiff and Class Members;
- b. Whether Defendant had respective duties not to disclose the PII of Plaintiff and

²⁶ <https://www.maine.gov/agviewer/content/ag/985235c7-cb95-4be2-8792-a1252b4f8318/6c038d1f-41db-4c57-9bdd-c1c7215b7eba.html>

Class Members to unauthorized third parties;

- c. Whether Defendant had respective duties not to use the PII of Plaintiff and Class Members for non-business purposes; and,
- d. Whether Defendant failed to adequately safeguard the PII of Plaintiff and Class Members.

100. Typicality: Plaintiff's claims are typical of those of the other members of the Class because Plaintiff, like every other Class Member, was exposed to virtually identical conduct and now suffers from the same violations of the law as each other member of the Class.

101. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is also appropriate for certification because Defendant acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby requiring the Court's imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class Members and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole.

102. Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members in that he has no disabling conflicts of interest that would be antagonistic to those of the other Class Members. Plaintiff seeks no relief that is antagonistic or adverse to the Class Members and the infringement of the rights and the damages he has suffered are typical of other Class Members.

103. Superiority and Manageability: The class litigation is an appropriate method for fair and efficient adjudication of the claims involved. Class action treatment is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein; it will permit a large number of Class Members to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort, and

expense that hundreds of individual actions would require.

CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT I

Negligence

(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

104. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 120, as if fully set forth herein.

105. Defendant requires its customers, including Plaintiff and Class Members, to submit non-public PII in the ordinary course of providing its services.

106. Defendant gathered and stored the PII of Plaintiff and Class Members as part of its business of soliciting its services to its customers, which solicitations and services affect commerce.

107. Plaintiff and Class Members entrusted Defendant with their PII with the understanding that Defendant would safeguard their information.

108. Defendant had full knowledge of the sensitivity of the PII and the types of harm that Plaintiff and Class Members could and would suffer if the PII were wrongfully disclosed.

109. By voluntarily undertaking and assuming the responsibility to collect and store this data, and in fact doing so, and sharing it and using it for commercial gain, Defendant had a duty of care to use reasonable means to secure and safeguard their computer property—and Class Members' PII held within it—to prevent disclosure of the information, and to safeguard the information from theft. Defendant's duty included a responsibility to implement processes by which they could detect a breach of its security systems in a reasonably expeditious period of time and to give prompt notice to those affected in the case of a data breach.

110. Defendant had a duty to employ reasonable security measures under Section 5 of

the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, which prohibits “unfair . . . practices in or affecting commerce,” including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair practice of failing to use reasonable measures to protect confidential data.

111. Defendant's duty to use reasonable security measures also arose under the GLBA, under which they were required to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer information by developing a comprehensive written information security program that contains reasonable administrative, technical, and physical safeguards.

112. Defendant's duty of care to use reasonable security measures arose as a result of the special relationship that existed between Defendant and Plaintiff and Class Members. That special relationship arose because Plaintiff and the Class entrusted Defendant with their confidential PII, a necessary part of being customers at Defendant.

113. Defendant's duty to use reasonable care in protecting confidential data arose not only as a result of the statutes and regulations described above, but also because Defendant is bound by industry standards to protect confidential PII.

114. Moreover, Defendant had a duty to promptly and adequately notify Plaintiff and the Class of the Data Breach.

115. Defendant had and continues to have a duty to adequately disclose that the PII of Plaintiff and the Class within Defendant's possession might have been compromised, how it was compromised, and precisely the types of data that were compromised and when. Such notice was necessary to allow Plaintiff and the Class to take steps to prevent, mitigate, and repair any identity theft and the fraudulent use of their PII by third parties.

116. Defendant breached its duties, pursuant to the FTC Act, GLBA, and other applicable standards, and thus was negligent, by failing to use reasonable measures to protect Class

Members' PII. The specific negligent acts and omissions committed by Defendant include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) failing to adopt, implement, and maintain adequate security measures to safeguard Class Members' PII; (b) failing to adequately monitor the security of their networks and systems; (c) allowing unauthorized access to Class Members' PII; (d) failing to detect in a timely manner that Class Members' PII had been compromised; (e) failing to remove former customers' PII it was no longer required to retain pursuant to regulations, and (f) failing to timely and adequately notify Class Members about the Data Breach's occurrence and scope, so that they could take appropriate steps to mitigate the potential for identity theft and other damages.

117. Defendant violated Section 5 of the FTC Act and GLBA by failing to use reasonable measures to protect PII and not complying with applicable industry standards, as described in detail herein. Defendant's conduct was particularly unreasonable given the nature and amount of PII it obtained and stored and the foreseeable consequences of the immense damages that would result to Plaintiff and the Class.

118. Plaintiff and Class Members were within the class of persons the Federal Trade Commission Act and GLBA were intended to protect and the type of harm that resulted from the Data Breach was the type of harm that the statutes were intended to guard against.

119. Defendant's violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act and GLBA constitutes negligence.

120. The FTC has pursued enforcement actions against businesses, which, as a result of their failure to employ reasonable data security measures and avoid unfair and deceptive practices, caused the same harm as that suffered by Plaintiff and the Class.

121. A breach of security, unauthorized access, and resulting injury to Plaintiff and the Class was reasonably foreseeable, particularly in light of Defendant's inadequate security

practices.

122. It was foreseeable that Defendant's failure to use reasonable measures to protect Class Members' PII would result in injury to Class Members. Further, the breach of security was reasonably foreseeable given the known high frequency of cyberattacks and data breaches in the financial services industry.

123. Defendant has full knowledge of the sensitivity of the PII and the types of harm that Plaintiff and the Class could and would suffer if the PII were wrongfully disclosed.

124. Plaintiff and the Class were the foreseeable and probable victims of any inadequate security practices and procedures. Defendant knew or should have known of the inherent risks in collecting and storing the PII of Plaintiff and the Class, the critical importance of providing adequate security of that PII, and the necessity for encrypting PII stored on Defendant's systems or transmitted through third party systems.

125. It was therefore foreseeable that the failure to adequately safeguard Class Members' PII would result in one or more types of injuries to Class Members.

126. Plaintiff and the Class had no ability to protect their PII that was in, and possibly remains in, Defendant's possession.

127. Defendant was in a position to protect against the harm suffered by Plaintiff and the Class as a result of the Data Breach.

128. Defendant's duty extended to protecting Plaintiff and the Class from the risk of foreseeable criminal conduct of third parties, which has been recognized in situations where the actor's own conduct or misconduct exposes another to the risk or defeats protections put in place to guard against the risk, or where the parties are in a special relationship. *See* Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B. Numerous courts and legislatures have also recognized the existence of

a specific duty to reasonably safeguard personal information.

129. Defendant has admitted that the PII of Plaintiff and the Class was wrongfully lost and disclosed to unauthorized third persons as a result of the Data Breach.

130. But for Defendant's wrongful and negligent breach of duties owed to Plaintiff and the Class, the PII of Plaintiff and the Class would not have been compromised.

131. There is a close causal connection between Defendant's failure to implement security measures to protect the PII of Plaintiff and the Class and the harm, or risk of imminent harm, suffered by Plaintiff and the Class. The PII of Plaintiff and the Class was lost and accessed as the proximate result of Defendant's failure to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding such PII by adopting, implementing, and maintaining appropriate security measures.

132. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered and will suffer injury, as alleged herein.

133. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to compensatory and consequential damages suffered as a result of the Data Breach.

134. Plaintiff and Class Members are also entitled to injunctive relief requiring Defendant to (i) strengthen its data security systems and monitoring procedures; (ii) submit to future annual audits of those systems and monitoring procedures; and (iii) continue to provide adequate credit monitoring to all Class Members.

COUNT II
Breach Of Implied Contract
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

135. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 120, as if fully set forth herein.

136. Plaintiff and Class Members were required deliver their PII to Defendant as part of

the process of obtaining products or services provided by Defendant. Plaintiff and Class Members paid money, or money was paid on their behalf, to Defendant in exchange for products or services and would not have paid for Defendant's products or services, or would have paid less for them, had they known that Defendant's data security practices were substandard.

137. Defendant solicited, offered, and invited Class Members to provide their PII as part of Defendant's regular business practices. Plaintiff and Class Members accepted Defendant's offers and provided their PII to Defendant.

138. Defendant accepted possession of Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII for the purpose of providing services to Plaintiff and Class Members.

139. Plaintiff and the Class entrusted their PII to Defendant. In so doing, Plaintiff and the Class entered into implied contracts with Defendant by which Defendant agreed to safeguard and protect such information, to keep such information secure and confidential, and to timely and accurately notify Plaintiff and the Class if their data had been breached and compromised or stolen.

140. In entering into such implied contracts, Plaintiff and Class Members reasonably believed and expected that Defendant's data security practices complied with relevant laws and regulations (including FTC guidelines on data security) and were consistent with industry standards.

141. Implicit in the agreement between Plaintiff and Class Members and the Defendant to provide PII, was the latter's obligation to: (a) use such PII for business purposes only, (b) take reasonable steps to safeguard that PII, (c) prevent unauthorized disclosures of the PII, (d) provide Plaintiff and Class Members with prompt and sufficient notice of any and all unauthorized access and/or theft of their PII, (e) reasonably safeguard and protect the PII of Plaintiff and Class Members from unauthorized disclosure or uses, (f) retain the PII only under conditions that kept such

information secure and confidential.

142. The mutual understanding and intent of Plaintiff and Class Members on the one hand, and Defendant, on the other, is demonstrated by their conduct and course of dealing.

143. On information and belief, at all relevant times Defendant promulgated, adopted, and implemented written privacy policies whereby it expressly promised Plaintiff and Class Members that it would only disclose PII under certain circumstances, none of which relate to the Data Breach.

144. On information and belief, Defendant further promised to comply with industry standards and to make sure that Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII would remain protected.

145. Plaintiff and Class Members paid money to Defendant with the reasonable belief and expectation that Defendant would use part of its earnings to obtain adequate data security. Defendant failed to do so.

146. Plaintiff and Class Members would not have entrusted their PII to Defendant in the absence of the implied contract between them and Defendant to keep their information reasonably secure.

147. Plaintiff and Class Members would not have entrusted their PII to Defendant in the absence of their implied promise to monitor their computer systems and networks to ensure that it adopted reasonable data security measures.

148. Every contract in this State has an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is an independent duty and may be breached even when there is no breach of a contract's actual and/or express terms.

149. Plaintiff and Class Members fully and adequately performed their obligations under the implied contracts with Defendant.

150. Defendant breached the implied contracts it made with Plaintiff and the Class by failing to safeguard and protect their personal information, by failing to delete the information of Plaintiff and the Class once the relationship ended, and by failing to provide accurate notice to them that personal information was compromised as a result of the Data Breach.

151. Defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to maintain adequate computer systems and data security practices to safeguard PII, failing to timely and accurately disclose the Data Breach to Plaintiff and Class Members and continued acceptance of PII and storage of other personal information after Defendant knew, or should have known, of the security vulnerabilities of the systems that were exploited in the Data Breach.

152. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of the implied contracts, Plaintiff and Class Members sustained damages, as alleged herein.

153. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to compensatory, consequential, and nominal damages suffered as a result of the Data Breach.

154. Plaintiff and Class Members are also entitled to injunctive relief requiring Defendant to, *e.g.*, (i) strengthen its data security systems and monitoring procedures; (ii) submit to future annual audits of those systems and monitoring procedures; and (iii) immediately provide adequate credit monitoring to all Class Members.

COUNT III
Unjust Enrichment
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

155. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 120, as if fully set forth herein.

156. Plaintiff brings this Count in the alternative to the breach of implied contract count above.

157. Plaintiff and Class Members conferred a monetary benefit on Defendant. Specifically, they paid Defendant and/or its agents for Financial institutions services and in so doing also provided Defendant with their PII. In exchange, Plaintiff and Class Members should have received from Defendant the services that were the subject of the transaction and should have had their PII protected with adequate data security.

158. Defendant knew that Plaintiff and Class Members conferred a benefit upon it and has accepted and retained that benefit by accepting and retaining the PII entrusted to it. Defendant profited from Plaintiff's retained data and used Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII for business purposes.

159. Defendant failed to secure Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII and, therefore, did not fully compensate Plaintiff or Class Members for the value that their PII provided.

160. Defendant acquired the PII through inequitable record retention as it failed to investigate and/or disclose the inadequate data security practices previously alleged.

161. If Plaintiff and Class Members had known that Defendant would not use adequate data security practices, procedures, and protocols to adequately monitor, supervise, and secure their PII, they would have entrusted their PII at Defendant or obtained services at Defendant.

162. Plaintiff and Class Members have no adequate remedy at law.

163. Defendant enriched itself by saving the costs it reasonably should have expended on data security measures to secure Plaintiff's and Class Members' Personal Information. Instead of providing a reasonable level of security that would have prevented the hacking incident, Defendant instead calculated to increase its own profit at the expense of Plaintiff and Class Members by utilizing cheaper, ineffective security measures and diverting those funds to its own profit. Plaintiff and Class Members, on the other hand, suffered as a direct and proximate result of

Defendant's decision to prioritize its own profits over the requisite security and the safety of their PII.

164. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for Defendant to be permitted to retain any of the benefits that Plaintiff and Class Members conferred upon it.

165. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered and will suffer injury, as alleged herein.

166. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to full refunds, restitution, and/or damages from Defendant and/or an order proportionally disgorging all profits, benefits, and other compensation obtained by Defendant from its wrongful conduct. This can be accomplished by establishing a constructive trust from which the Plaintiff and Class Members may seek restitution or compensation.

167. Plaintiff and Class Members may not have an adequate remedy at law against Defendant, and accordingly, they plead this claim for unjust enrichment in addition to, or in the alternative to, other claims pleaded herein.

COUNT IV
Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law,
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 *et seq.*
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the California Subclass)

168. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 120, as if fully set forth herein, and bring this claim on behalf of himself and the California Subclass (the "Class" for the purposes of this count).

169. Defendant is a "person" defined by Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17201.

170. Defendant violated Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 *et seq.* ("UCL") by engaging in unlawful, unfair, and deceptive business acts and practices.

171. Defendant's "unfair" acts and practices include:

- a. by utilizing cheaper, ineffective security measures and diverting those funds to its own profit, instead of providing a reasonable level of security that would have prevented the hacking incident;
- b. failing to follow industry standard and the applicable, required, and appropriate protocols, policies, and procedures regarding the encryption of data;
- c. failing to timely and adequately notify Class Members about the Data Breach's occurrence and scope, so that they could take appropriate steps to mitigate the potential for identity theft and other damages;
- d. Omitting, suppressing, and concealing the material fact that it did not reasonably or adequately secure Plaintiff's and Class Members' personal information; and
- e. Omitting, suppressing, and concealing the material fact that it did not comply with common law and statutory duties pertaining to the security and privacy of Plaintiff's and Class Members' personal information, including duties imposed by the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 and GLBA.

172. Defendant has engaged in "unlawful" business practices by violating multiple laws, including the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, GLBA, and California common law.

173. Defendant's unlawful, unfair, and deceptive acts and practices include:

- a. Failing to implement and maintain reasonable security and privacy measures to protect Plaintiff's and Class Members' personal information, which was a direct and proximate cause of the Data Breach;
- b. Failing to identify foreseeable security and privacy risks, remediate identified security and privacy risks, which was a direct and proximate cause of the Data Breach;
- c. Failing to comply with common law and statutory duties pertaining to the security

and privacy of Plaintiff's and Class Members' personal information, including duties imposed by the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, and GLBA, which was a direct and proximate cause of the Data Breach;

d. Misrepresenting that it would protect the privacy and confidentiality of Plaintiff's and Class Members' personal information, including by implementing and maintaining reasonable security measures; and

e. Misrepresenting that it would comply with common law and statutory duties pertaining to the security and privacy of Plaintiff's and Class Members' personal information, including duties imposed by the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 and GLBA.

174. Defendant's representations and omissions were material because they were likely to deceive reasonable consumers about the adequacy of Defendant's data security and ability to protect the confidentiality of consumers' personal information.

175. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent acts and practices, Plaintiff and Class Members' were injured and lost money or property, which would not have occurred but for the unfair and deceptive acts, practices, and omissions alleged herein, time and expenses related to monitoring their financial accounts for fraudulent activity, an increased, imminent risk of fraud and identity theft, and loss of value of their personal information.

176. Defendant's violations were, and are, willful, deceptive, unfair, and unconscionable.

177. Plaintiff and Class Members have lost money and property as a result of Defendant's conduct in violation of the UCL, as stated herein and above.

178. By deceptively storing, collecting, and disclosing their personal information, Defendant has taken money or property from Plaintiff and Class Members.

179. Defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, and maliciously to violate California's Unfair Competition Law, and recklessly disregarded Plaintiff's and Class Members' rights.

180. Plaintiff and Class Members seek all monetary and nonmonetary relief allowed by law, including restitution of all profits stemming from Defendant's unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices or use of their personal information; declaratory relief; reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5; injunctive relief; and other appropriate equitable relief, including public injunctive relief.

COUNT V
Violation Of The California Consumer Privacy Act,
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100 *et seq.*
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the California Subclass)

181. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 120, as if fully set forth herein, and bring this claim on behalf of himself and the California Subclass (the "Class" for the purposes of this count).

182. The California Consumer Privacy Act ("CCPA"), Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.150(a), creates a private cause of action for violations of the CCPA. Section 1798.150(a) specifically provides:

Any consumer whose nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information, as defined in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 1798.81.5, is subject to an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of the business's violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information to protect the personal information may institute a civil action for any of the following:

- (A) To recover damages in an amount not less than one hundred dollars (\$100) and not greater than seven hundred and fifty (\$750) per consumer per incident or actual damages, whichever is greater.
- (B) Injunctive or declaratory relief.
- (C) Any other relief the court deems proper.

183. Defendant is a “business” under § 1798.140(b) in that it is a corporation organized for profit or financial benefit of its shareholders or other owners, with gross revenue in excess of \$25 million.

184. Plaintiff and Class Members are covered “consumers” under § 1798.140(g) in that they are natural persons who are California residents.

185. The personal information of Plaintiff and the Class Members at issue in this lawsuit constitutes “personal information” under § 1798.150(a) and 1798.81.5, in that the personal information Defendant collects and which was impacted by the cybersecurity attack includes an individual’s first name or first initial and the individual’s last name in combination with one or more of the following data elements, with either the name or the data elements not encrypted or redacted: (i) Social Security number; (ii) Driver’s license number, California identification card number, tax identification number, passport number, military identification number, or other unique identification number issued on a government document commonly used to verify the identity of a specific individual; (iii) account number or credit or debit card number, in combination with any required security code, access code, or password that would permit access to an individual’s financial account; (iv) medical information; (v) health insurance information; (vi) unique biometric data generated from measurements or technical analysis of human body characteristics, such as a fingerprint, retina, or iris image, used to authenticate a specific individual.

186. Defendant knew or should have known that its computer systems and data security practices were inadequate to safeguard the Class Members’ personal information and that the risk of a data breach or theft was highly likely. Defendant failed to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information to protect the personal information of Plaintiff and the Class Members. Specifically, Defendant subjected

Plaintiff's and the Class Members' nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information to an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of the Defendant's violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information, as described herein.

187. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's violation of its duty, the unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure of Plaintiff's and Class Members' personal information included exfiltration, theft, or disclosure through Defendant's servers, systems, and website, and/or the dark web, where hackers further disclosed the personal identifying information alleged herein.

188. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's acts, Plaintiff and the Class Members were injured and lost money or property, including but not limited to the loss of Plaintiff's and Class Members' legally protected interest in the confidentiality and privacy of their personal information, stress, fear, and anxiety, nominal damages, and additional losses described above.

189. Section 1798.150(b) specifically provides that "[n]o [prefiling] notice shall be required prior to an individual consumer initiating an action solely for actual pecuniary damages."

190. On March 26, 2025, pursuant to California Civil Code § 1798.150(b), Plaintiffs mailed a CCPA notice letter to Defendant's registered service agents, detailing the specific provisions of the CCPA that Defendant has violated and continues to violate. If Defendant cannot cure within 30 days—and Plaintiffs believes such cure is not possible under these facts and circumstances—then Plaintiffs intends to promptly amend this Complaint to seek statutory damages as permitted by the CCPA.

191. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Class Members by way of this complaint seek actual

pecuniary damages suffered as a result of Defendant's violations described herein.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and Class Members, requests judgment against Defendant and that the Court grants the following:

- A. For an Order certifying the Class, and appointing Plaintiff and his Counsel to represent the Class;
- B. For equitable relief enjoining Defendant from engaging in the wrongful conduct complained of herein pertaining to the misuse and/or disclosure of the PII of Plaintiff and Class Members;
- C. For injunctive relief and other equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of Plaintiff and Class Members;
- D. For an award of damages, including actual, nominal, consequential, and punitive damages, as allowed by law in an amount to be determined;
- E. For an award of attorneys' fees, costs, and litigation expenses, as allowed by law;
- F. For prejudgment interest on all amounts awarded; and
- G. Such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all claims so triable.

Dated: March 26, 2025

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Thomas A. Pacheco

Thomas A. Pacheco (Bar No. 1712140091)

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